but, above all, that those violations undermine or present a serious risk of undermining, in a sufficiently direct manner, the sound financial management of the Union’s budget or the protection of its financial interests”.
It was in exchange for such an assurance, confirmed by a declaration of the EU-27 at the December 2020 European Council, that the Polish and Hungarian prime ministers agreed to lift their vetoes for the adoption of the EU’s 2021–27 multi-annual budget and NextGenerationEU recovery plan.
However, even before the ECJ validated this mechanism by dismissing Poland and Hungary’s case, the Commission had already started using it to demand that Poland reverse its reforms of the judiciary and Hungary repeal its June 2021 law that banned LGBT propaganda to minors. In the case of Poland, the Commission argues that the lack of independence of the judiciary (in the eyes of the Commission) does not allow adequate supervision of the use of the NextGenerationEU funds, even though Poland is among the EU’s best performers in terms of transparent and compliant use of EU funds and the fight against corruption. The other reason given by the Commission for withholding the NextGenerationEU funds for Poland is the October judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court, which affirmed the primacy of the Polish Constitution over the judgments of the ECJ in areas where the treaties have not transferred competences to the EU (in this case, the organisation of the judiciary). In the case of Hungary, the Commission officially gives reasons related to corruption problems that have not been resolved by Budapest, while unofficially letting it be known that it is the law on the protection of minors that is really the problem.
In fact, the Commission now has a powerful instrument of blackmail to push forward European integration without a new treaty.

















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