Kursk Incursion: Will Russians or Ukrainians "Yank the Wheel First"?

Suicide or a state-of-the-art military operation? For weeks, experts have speculated about the purpose of the Ukrainian incursion into Russia. What is certain is that the Ukrainians have surprised not only their enemies but even their own allies. We sat down with Krisztian Jojart, a researcher at the John Lukács Institute at the National University of Public Service, to try to unravel the motives behind the Kursk offensive.

Destroyed Russian tank in the Kursk region (Photo: AFP)

– The plans for last year's big Ukrainian counter-offensive were leaked early, and the offensive was an abject failure. This year, everyone expected the Ukrainians to mount an active defence. Were you surprised by the Kursk incursion?

– Well, it surprised me, but it also surprised the Russians and even the Ukrainians' Western allies. This time, having learned from last year's experience when all their plans were leaked, Kyiv did not consult anyone. Back then, the Russians already knew the main strategic direction of the counter-offensive, the timing of its launch, and the pace of training and arming the new units. According to press reports, this time the details were only shared with a narrow circle within Ukraine's military leadership, with the deployed troops being informed just a day or two before the operation. So, they did an excellent job of keeping their plans a secret.

– Is it really possible that the Western allies, who always assist the Ukrainians with intelligence, did not know about the attack in advance?

– Western intelligence wasn't necessarily needed; the Ukrainians have their own reconnaissance capabilities. I think it’s quite possible that they didn’t inform the Americans this time—precisely because they’ve already been 'burned by them' once.

After what happened, the Ukrainians may feel that their Western allies cannot keep secrets and cannot be fully trusted.

Krisztian Jojart. Photo: Anders G Warne

– How come the Russians were so unprepared for this offensive?

– Judging from posts shared by Russian military bloggers, the Russians saw that something was brewing, and they did report to Moscow Ukrainian military activity in areas around to Kursk. However, they thought it was just a form of pressure. Or they may have thought that the Ukrainians were just preparing for defence, fearing another Russian incursion in the region.

– Why was the Russian defense line so paper-thin?

– Because the resources of both sides were extremely stretched. Most of the Russian forces are tied up in the Donbass. The Ukrainian operation has already proved that the Russians have no strategic reserves. This area was indeed poorly defended, guarded mainly by conscripts who were unprepared to fend off such an attack. No wonder they surrendered en masse without any particular resistance. Besides them, only border guards and Chechen forces - who previously cooperated with the Wagner Group and integrated many of its former members - were stationed in the area. However, the defense line was not just weak regarding the mounted personnel; besides a few trenches against military tanks it was short of anything else. But why? Partly because it's a populated area, so they were unable to carry out any significant fortification work, or plant land mines. 

It's also worth a mention that there area used to have a council in charge of coordinating the army and other paramilitary formations and internal affairs agencies, but it was disbanded a few months ago by Russian General Alexander Lapin.

 In their assessment, there was no need for it because the region was not under threat, at least not to a degree that the army could not handle by itself.

– How is the Kursk front now?

– Ukraine's advance has not yet been stopped, only slowed down. It’s difficult to determine exactly how much territory they control; for instance, just because they raise a Ukrainian flag somewhere doesn’t necessarily mean they fully control the area. Currently, they control roughly a thousand square kilometers. Another important development in recent days is that three of the five bridges over the River Sheym have been blown up. This threatens to cut off supplies to Russian forces in the Glushkovo area, as the two remaining bridges are located right next to the Ukrainian border, making them hardly practical to use.

NEW: Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 22.

The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk… pic.twitter.com/GTZslvQDIo

— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) August 23, 2024

– Could they even besiege Kursk?

– I see no chance of that. Kursk is too far away, too large a city, and the Ukrainians are certainly not strong enough to besiege it. They have deployed four or five brigades of various forces, roughly 10-15 thousand men. With that kind of troop count, digging in and setting up a defensive position may be a realistic goal.

– And now a question that's been on everyone's mind for weeks: what is all this for?

– The Ukrainians' military objective may be to create a dilemma for the Russians, forcing them to redeploy their units and thereby alleviate the enormous pressure on the Donbas region.

The idea might be that if the Russians want to push the Ukrainians out, they will be forced to draw better-trained troops from elsewhere due to a lack of strategic reserves.

However, the success of this strategy is still uncertain. The Russians can divert forces not only from the Donbas but also from other, less critical fronts, such as Zaporizhzhya in the south, where they are not currently conducting any offensive operations. This is already happening. Moreover, Moscow may decide that, for now, it is enough to stabilize the front, stop the Ukrainian advance, and then resume their offensive in the Donbas with full force. At the moment, the Russians seem to be leaning toward the latter approach. They are downplaying the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk and are certainly unwilling to jeopardize the progress they've made so far in the Donbas.

Passers-by near a shelter in downtown Kursk on August 22, 2024. Concrete shelters are being set up in the city after Ukrainian troops invaded Ukraine's border area in Russia's Kursk region on August 6. (Photo: MTI/EPA)

– What may be the Ukrainians' political and informational objective? 

1. Firstly, to boost the morale of both the hinterland and the army. After all, they've been in retreat since last fall. Now, they've shown they can surprise the Russians.
2. Secondly, they aimed to demonstrate to the West what they are capable of. They've shown that there is no stalemate and that, with the right support, they can achieve results. They also highlighted that if they had been allowed to use long-range weapons against Russian territory, they wouldn’t have been forced to invade Kursk.
3. Thirdly, the Ukrainians want to prove that there are no actual Russian red lines. They don't believe that the incursion into Kursk will have any significant consequences, and they see the constant threats of general mobilization and nuclear weapons as rhetorical bluffs.
4. Finally, their main expectation is that the Russian political system is more fragile than it appears from the outside. They hope that if the Russians lose territory of their own and many of their troops are taken prisoner—a scenario that recalls bad memories from the Chechen and Afghan wars—it could destabilize the Moscow leadership. However, I see little chance of a change in Russian domestic politics; the elite seems united.

– What are the Ukrainians risking with this military operation?

– They are not in a poition to spare four or five brigades from other parts of the front. In the Donbas, their defenses are extremely stretched, with the Russians capturing settlements one by one.

There is a serious lack of resources and reserves that would allow them to rotate their combat troops.

Their long-term goal is also in question. If they want to hold onto the occupied territories at all costs, or even expand their control, they will need to redeploy more and more troops. Alternatively, they might eventually be satisfied with their achievements and decide to withdraw. The key question now is who will "yank the wheel" first.