It has become a near classic question: what funds for Hungary are still blocked by the European Union?
In fact, three operational programs are currently suspended following a decision by the Council last December. These are Top plus, the 2021-27 part of the Operational Program for Territorial and Settlement Development, Kehop plus, the 2021-27 part of the Operational Program for the Environment and Energy Efficiency, and Ikop plus, 55 per cent of the 2021-27 part of the Operational Program for Transport. Of these three operational programs, 45 percent is already accessible, while 55 percent was suspended by the Council last December until further decision or consideration.
What additional conditions has the European Commission set for the release of these funds?
The rule of law procedure against Hungary, which was launched in April 2022, after the parliamentary elections, should be closed. However, for political reasons, there is little chance of this happening, as the European Council would then have to admit that Hungary fully meets all the requirements and that neither the Commission nor the member states have any reservations concerning Hungary. We can see that this procedure is being carried on for political reasons, but we will nevertheless continue to negotiate, because we have still not received a large proportion of the EU funds that Hungary is rightfully entitled to. Therefore we must get the ratio of suspended funds reduced as quickly as possible, so that a growing part of the funds in the operational programs is unlocked. The closing of and financial reporting on EU projects funded in the 2014-2020 period is underway, and so far Hungary has used 95 percent of the allocated funds. I think this is very important because Hungary is in the lead in the EU in this respect. All in all, Hungary implemented around 52,000 projects drawing on EU money in the 2014-2020 period, implying that we are making good use of the resources we are entitled to.
In the context of EU funds, the financial implications of Ukraine's possible EU accession have repeatedly come up recently. What financial burden would this entail for Hungary?
This hasn't yet been calculated fully. However, the structure for Ukraine's eventual accession to take place is another important question. Can I give an example? It is quite likely that a significant portion of both agricultural subsidies and cohesion funds would go to Ukraine, since the country has very low development indicators in this area. Thus, if the European Union budget were to be allocated according to the current principles, Ukraine, along with Moldova, would take the vast majority of the currently available funds, several thousand billion euros. This is also why we believe that Ukraine's accession is premature.
How can you find the common denominator for a Bulgarian mindset and a French way of thinking, for example? Is it possible to call the EU a cultural community in its current state?
It is not yet possible to call the European Union a cultural community. Robert Schuman thought at the time that for European integration to survive and develop, it would be necessary to create a cultural community that respects the sovereignty of nations. From this point of view, the answer to your question is that it is relatively easy to find common ground between a Bulgarian and a Frenchman, or easier to find the common denominator when we are going through a period of growth and the surplus has to be distributed, but much more difficult to find it when we are in a period of decline and the deficit has to be shared. Currently, the European Union is going through an economic period that is not very bright, with most countries experiencing stagnation or rather low growth. Is this a situation when we want to make a financial commitment that will jeopardize the bloc's competitiveness in the medium term? The cost of supporting Ukraine and its future EU membership are generating tensions that the European Union is now unable to resolve.
Would Ukraine's EU accession bring peace or rather war to the European Union?
Ukraine is a country at war, defending its land while some of its territory is under occupation. Ukraine cannot therefore fulfill one of the basic conditions for opening accession negotiations because it cannot say how much territory and population the country actually has. The international community recognizes Ukraine's claim to the Russian-populated areas in eastern Ukraine, but these are not actually under Ukrainian control. In other words, starting accession negotiations with a government that cannot define its territory and population size upon joining the European Union are factors of uncertainty that are risky for the future of the Union as a whole.
To what extent have the lines of power previously seen in the European Union changed in recent years?
In this respect, Brexit was a watershed move, as the UK's membership in the EU also meant that there was a strong, pro-intergovernmental, great power position to counterbalance the traditional Franco-German ambitions and offset continental aspirations. With Britain's departure, France and Germany clearly concluded that integration had to be accelerated to a greater extent. This has clearly exacerbated the political conflicts within the European Union, as it is now obvious that Western European countries are not economically capable of driving the European Union. The most dynamic growth and most competitive region of the Bloc is the Central Europe, which is also demanding to have its voice heard in EU decision-making and in shaping its future.
To what extent will these shifts in power be reflected in the results of the EU elections?
The main question is whether the grand coalition - in effect, governing European integration from a majority position since 1952, when the European Coal and Steel Community was created - which was comprised of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals, will win a majority in the new European Parliament. The other scenario is that these parties will have to find some other form of cooperation for themselves. This could also lead to a very serious shift of emphasis in the activity of the European Parliament.
Have Christian and social democracy really become obsolete and faded in the large EU member states, or is this just a temporary situation?
It is difficult to predict whether this is a temporary situation or a permanent decline. I believe that it is a transitional state, and that the relative decline of Christian democracy is due in part to Western Europe abandoning the path set out by the great founding fathers after the Second World War. This was a vision that enabled them to manage European communities, national interests and national aspirations in harmony. I believe that the mission of the Christian Democratic parties in Central Europe is precisely to try to course correct the current path. If they succeed in doing so, I am convinced that Christian democracy can also regain the support of the European electorate.
What impact can Hungary's EU Presidency have on the strengthening of Christian democracy?
After the European Parliamentary elections, the new European Parliament will form by early July, start its first negotiations and hear the next President-designate of the European Commission. The new European Commission will also be formed in this six-month period, and European Council President Charles Michel's successor will be elected. The EU presidency will therefore have to play a mediating role alongside its traditional policy tasks. In a year of institutional renewal, there is often a need to mediate between the disputing parties and to facilitate this renewal. If the Hungarian EU Presidency can do this effectively, it can also contribute to raising the profile of Christian democracy in Central Europe.
What will the new EU institutions be like after the elections?
The composition of the European Commission does not depend primarily on the European Parliament elections, but rather on the current state of member states' governments. Consequently, I do not expect a dramatic change there. The situation is similar for the European Council, which is made up of ministers from the governments of the member states. I do not expect a huge turnaround here either. However, the composition of the European Parliament could change significantly, as current forecasts show that the left-wing parties will lose ground and the right-wing parties will gain. The polls show that the Christian democratic people's parties, who are part of the European People's Party (EPP), will win, while the conservative right-wing parties could also strengthen significantly. In the event of such a result, the future of European internal politics will depend on whether the EPP wants to maintain its centrist coalition of Liberals, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats or whether it opens up to the right and continues to work with conservative parties and other right-wing groups.
With a new European Parliament, what will the next five years look like, how do you see the future of Europe?
European integration is generally said to be in crisis all the time. What is new now is the external environment, with war on the borders of the European Union and increasing tensions in the Middle East and the Balkans. This makes the functioning of European integration much more uncertain. Another new development is the emergence of much sharper political conflicts within European domestic politics, and the opposing poles and fault lines that are commonplace within member states are emerging at the European level. The result, in my view, is that we have to prepare for a much more intense, much more conflict-riddled European politics than we have seen so far.
