– The Brussels political elite is increasingly pushing for Ukraine to join the EU before 2030, if possible. Critics argue that this poses numerous risks, particularly in agriculture, where it could render life for producers in other member states unviable. How do you assess the current competitiveness of Ukraine’s agricultural sector in EU markets?
– The key question is whether we are assessing Ukraine’s competitiveness, or that of the corporations operating there — companies registered in various parts of the world but investing in Ukraine. Ukraine is a corrupt country at war, with half-ruined infrastructure. A significant portion of its workforce is on the front lines or recovering at home from injuries. Large areas of its farmland are littered with landmines, and some are contaminated with radioactive substances due to so-called "dirty bombs." If we look at competitiveness in this context, the picture is quite grim. However, Ukraine possesses 41.3 million hectares of agricultural land, which accounts for 26 percent of the European Union’s total agricultural land. Of that, 32.7 million hectares is arable land — a full third of all arable land in the EU.
Take sunflower production, as just one example: Ukraine produces 16.8 million tonnes annually, compared to 10.3 million tonnes for the entire European Union. That means Ukraine produces 58 percent more than all 27 EU member states combined.
In addition, the competitiveness of Ukraine is bolstered by the high quality of its soil: 9 percent of the world’s black soil, or chernozem, is found in Ukraine. This gives it an extraordinary advantage. The land ownership structure also appears to tilt the scales in Ukraine’s favor. Unlike in EU member states, large-scale farming operations dominate in Ukraine, with over half the farmland consisting of plots larger than 1,000 hectares. Much of this land is owned by large international holding companies with immense capital and access to state-of-the-art machinery.
– What would all this mean in the long term for agricultural producers in current EU member states?
– In several respects, they would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. For one, they are producing under very different conditions. Within the EU, nearly every phase of production is subject to strict regulation — from how soil may be cultivated, to how much fertilizer can be used, to limits on antibiotics in livestock farming.
In addition, EU law mandates GMO-free production, and there's an effort that - by 2030 - at least 30 percent of farmland must be under ecological management. Ukraine, on the other hand, faces no such constraints.
They grow genetically modified crops, and there are no restrictions on what types of pesticides may be used. For example, they use substances like chlorpyrifos and atrazine, which have been banned in the EU for years due to their severe health risks, including cancer.
– The supporters of Ukraine’s EU accession often cite the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), arguing that it would impose the same rules on Ukraine as it once did on Hungary. In your view, how effectively would the CAP ensure a level playing field for Ukraine within the EU market?
– There’s simply no realistic chance that Ukraine could comply with the same conditions currently required of EU member states in the foreseeable future. It’s impossible. EU accession works like this: a country submits an application, and the EU then reviews everything from the state of rule of law to the structure of agricultural production. A country must meet a wide range of criteria.
Only after these have been assessed can the EU decide whether to grant official candidate status to the applicant country. For example, Turkey submitted its application 28 years ago and has been an official candidate for 26 years now. Serbia applied 16 years ago, became a candidate country 13 years ago, and has nearly closed all accession chapters. It has also restructured its economy to align with EU standards — a development process that, once begun, leaves little room for reversal.
Ukraine, by contrast, submitted its membership application just four days after the war broke out, on February 28, 2022. By June 23 of that same year, it had already been granted candidate status. What took other countries years, Ukraine achieved in three months.
And all this while the country is at war, corruption is rampant, reliable information is lacking, and the country's entire agricultural model is fundamentally different from that of EU member states. Moreover, it has been allocated significant funding via the so-called Ukraine Facility — essentially a Ukrainian accession fund — with a total budget of €50 billion. By comparison, as pre-accession funding, Poland once received approximately €5.7 billion, and Hungary about €1.7 billion. So when Brussels says Ukraine will be ready for membership, it defies reality. Based on current circumstances, not ten, but even twenty years would not be enough for Ukraine to meet existing EU requirements. It is unfit, in every respect.
– What's your take on the EU’s plans to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)?
– It’s no coincidence that the EU is pushing this reform right now. This is how they plan to provide financial resources — and later, subsidies — for Ukrainian business entities in connection with the country's potential accession. Reconstruction is also part of this effort. So far, the European Union has allocated more than €180 billion to Ukraine.
If the CAP were to be completely overhauled according to the current proposals, Hungary would end up receiving less than half of the area-based support it currently does.
What’s worse, the funding would be tied to rule-of-law criteria — distributed on a political basis, giving money to whoever they want, in whatever amounts they see fit. This would create full exposure, total unpredictability, and chaos, and not just for Hungary, but across nearly every EU member state, for farmers.
– What specific risks do you see in this process for Hungarian farmers?
– We have historical experience with the effects of cheap Ukrainian products of uncertain origin flooding the Hungarian market. When we opened solidarity corridors — so Ukraine could ship grain through Romanian ports — our own silos filled up with Ukrainian grain. Our domestic markets collapsed. Prices were slashed in half, while input costs doubled due to war-related sanctions.
It’s like stepping onto a racetrack with hundred-kilogram weights tied to our legs, while they run beside us in sneakers.
They operate with no restrictions, while we strictly follow EU regulations — and that’s something we simply can’t withstand. On top of that, major investors from older EU member states have bought up vast tracts of land in Ukraine. Some of these holdings are bigger than Hungary’s largest agricultural counties. It’s no surprise they’re pushing so hard for Ukraine’s fast-track accession — once it’s in, their investments will pay off handsomely.
They can produce without any oversight due to different farming practices, while their labor and energy costs are less than half the EU average. There are no restrictions, they have farmland, so the conditions for growing crops are excellent. They enjoy a competitive advantage of over fifty percent.
– Which agricultural sectors do you believe are especially vulnerable?
– As I mentioned earlier, grain and sunflower production are especially exposed. Due to climate change, our domestic production structure is shifting—corn acreage is declining, while sunflower planting is expanding. In this, Hungary simply cannot compete with Ukraine.
Ukraine joining the EU would be a disaster for Hungarian sunflower farmers, as Ukrainians produce sunflower at less than half the cost.
This would also cripple Hungary’s vegetable oil sector. Ukraine can easily supply the entire EU with cooking oil. And the byproducts of sunflower processing—which are high in protein and energy—make excellent livestock feed. Ukrainian accession would drive Hungarian crop producers out of business entirely.
– What can the Hungarian government and Magosz do to protect the interests of Hungarian farmers in light of the risks posed by Ukraine’s potential EU membership?
– I can calmly say that we're fighting with all our might. When the grain crisis hit, we organized protests at Zhony and along the Ukrainian border. We maintain strong ties with the Visegrad Four, and we’ve reached the point where we gathered over 250,000 signatures and personally delivered a petition to the President of the European Commission in Brussels.
They didn’t even respond. Then, on May 20, we protested in Brussels with 70 EU-based farming organizations. When the Hungarian government fights for its farmers, it’s not just defending our interests—it’s standing up for farmers across the entire EU. We voice our opinions openly in plenary sessions, while other representatives stay silent—then approach us in the hallway to say, “We’re glad you spoke up. We feel the same way, but we can’t say it ourselves.”
– Gyorgy Rasko, Hungary’s former state secretary for agriculture, openly supports Ukraine’s EU accession. The leftist expert says he "occasionally" advises Peter Magyar and the Tisza Party on agricultural and rural issues, and he’s even been floated as a potential agriculture minister in a future Tisza-led government. What kind of agricultural policy do you think Mr. Magyar’s party would pursue, in light of that?
– Subservience, submission, humiliation, and slow decay — these are the words that come to mind. We are fully aware of Mr. Rasko’s official record. Under the Antall government, the food industry was dismantled. We know exactly how they carried out its privatization. The national assets we’ve worked hard to rebuild — he and his associates know all too well how to tear them down. They’ve done it before. They had the time and the opportunity, but I believe they won’t get it again.
