No Peace Without Catharsis

Nicolai N. Petro gave an exclusive interview to Magyar Nemzet. The professor of political science previously served as a special assistant for policy in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the U.S. Department of State during President George H. W. Bush’s administration. In his latest book, The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution, he examines the Ukrainian conflict through the lens of classical Greek tragedy, highlighting its deep domestic roots.

Nicolai N. Petro (Photo: Screenshot)

Recurring conflict is a problem of the heart, as much as it is of political institutions. This is as true of nations as it is of individuals. The enduring value of classical Greek tragedy is that it seeks to induce a change of heart or catharsis. This purging of emotions is so powerful that it allows emotions such as pity and compassion to enter the soul, and to take the place of rage.

By showing the horrors that result from the unyielding pursuit of vengeance, Greek playwrights tried to lead citizens away from anger and vengeance, and toward compassion. By replacing rage with reason, they believed catharsis could liberate both individuals and societies from the tragic cycle of vengeance. Catharsis is based on the ability to see the enemy, the Other, as a co-sufferer, so that endless conflict can give way to dialogue, and eventually forgiveness. Put another way, no conflict can ever be resolved without a catharsis.

Is Reconciliation Possible in the Midst of War?

What could such a form of catharsis mean for the future of the Ukrainian state and society? Is it even possible in the midst of an ongoing war?

I believe that Sophocles, Euripides, and Aeschylus would prescribe for Ukrainian society what they prescribed for themselves: a profound shift in social attitudes that would allow people who hate each other to engage in dialogue.

In my book I suggest that Ukraine would benefit from a Truth and Reconciliation process, which has helped scores of countries to heal conflicts, both domestic and international. This would be an important step in reconciling the antagonistic segments of Ukrainian society, and in restoring trust in government institutions.

Two Nations in One State – Recognizing the Identity of Eastern Ukraine

In your book, you highlight that many people in eastern and southern Ukraine identify with Russian cultural identity. What are the consequences if this identity is not recognized at the political level?

The persistent divisions within Ukrainian society derive from its history of being a focus of contention between rival empires, including Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottomans. When these empires collapsed, their frictions were often inherited by the countries that emerged from them.

The largest community within modern Ukraine are those seeking to preserve a cultural, religious, and linguistic tie with Russia. In my book I refer to them not as 'Russian speakers,' which oversimplifies their identity, but as Maloross Ukrainians. This older term was commonly used before the Bolshevik Revolution because it highlights that this identity goes far beyond language and religious affiliation.

These two Ukrainian identities, which can be thought of as two nations living in one state, have not yet learned how to live together, and this has led to the bloody war that the country is enduring today.

Do you think it is possible for Ukraine to develop an inclusive national narrative in the long term—one that provides a legitimate place for its Russian-speaking population? If so, how?

It is certainly possible. Other countries have done it—Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, India, Indonesia, to name a few. The main obstacle that needs to be overcome is atavistic nationalism, which says that a nation must consist of only one monolithic identity, and which therefore sees all other identities as threats.

Such nationalism seeks to redefine and restrict ethnicity, language, religion, and historical memory. Eventually, however, the list expands to include almost any characteristic, which is why nationalism is often seen as a precursor to Fascism and Nazism.

What role has the international community—especially the West—played in either easing or exacerbating Ukraine’s internal tensions?

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently stated that the West is involved in a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. This makes it a continuation of what 19th century British rulers commonly referred to as 'The Great Game'—a global chess match between rival powers aimed at shifting the overall balance of power in their favor.

The impact on any nation caught up in the 'game' has always been devastating, as the competing powers each promote their indigenous supporters, thereby inflaming existing social tensions. The Maidan coup became one such 'civilizational choice' in favor of the West. This in turn led to the rebellions of Crimea and Donbass, which were supported by Russia.

In your view, would the West be willing to accept a Ukrainian national vision that is not exclusively Western-oriented but also culturally multipolar?

The West contains many diverse elites, with many diverse agendas. While it is hard to imagine the current political leadership of the EU accepting a neutral Ukraine that had good relations with both Russia and the EU (this was already an obstacle during the EU Association talks in 2013), the political climate in Europe and the United States seems to be shifting away from this group, and toward elites that place their own national interest first. 

It is therefore possible that, when current political leaders are replaced by their national electorates, their successors will seek better relations with Russia, even at the expense of Ukraine, since Russia is a far more important neighbor for Europe.

Photo: wikimedia

What do you see as the biggest challenge in conveying your book’s message to the direct actors in the conflict? How might this kind of discourse gain wider societal resonance?

The biggest challenge in the resolution of any conflict, large or small, is getting the parties now immersed in the conflict to recognize the extent to which they themselves helped to bring about this conflict. That is why the Greeks said that true object of dialogue was self-transformation. The essence of Greek tragedy lies in self-reflection—the recognition of our own flaws.

Raymond Williams captured this perfectly when he said that, "Tragedy rests not in the individual destiny... but in the general condition, of a people reducing or destroying itself because it is not conscious of its true condition."

Greek playwrights could convey this message through plays that were mandatory for the entire polis. Today we cannot gather all citizens in one place, but governments could use social media to spread a message of tolerance, dialogue, and forgiveness of our enemies, if they wanted to. Of course, in a world of rival nation-states it would be naive to expect political leaders to do so, unless it could be shown to benefit their own political careers, and as being the supreme national interest. Over the past few decades several senior diplomats have tried to steer American foreign policy in this direction, including George F. Kennan, Amb. Jack F. Matlock, Jr, and Amb. Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

Lessons and Surprises

On a personal level, how has your perspective on the Ukraine–Russia relationship changed during the course of your research? Was there any insight that particularly surprised you?

I was struck by the consensus that once existed among scholars on the totalitarian aspirations of nationalism. Reinhold Niebuhr once commented that nationalism is when “the nation pretends to be God.”

I was impressed by the successes of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in healing social wounds in many countries—after apartheid in South Africa, following civil war in Guatemala, and after the dictatorship in Spain.

In Ukraine we can point to the remarkable peacemaking efforts of Sergei Sivokho, who set up a National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity. Unfortunately, he was hounded out of his position by Ukrainian nationalists, and died soon afterwards.

I am sometimes accused of being too naive about politics. I would counter that if a policy fails to achieve the results it promises (like sanctions on Russia, which were supposed to lead to the collapse of the Russian economy), then expecting success from more of the same is both naive and irresponsible.

Policies should be judged by their results, and when a policy has persistently failed, governments should consider other approaches. In the case of Ukraine, Western efforts to promote security through escalation have patently failed. Why not, then, see if better results can be achieved by reducing military involvement, rather than expanding it?

There is historical precedent for this—the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. A ceasefire was finally achieved not through increasing arms and support for South Korea, but through a total embargo—monitored by the UN— on any new weapons being introduced onto the peninsula. While this is certainly not an optimal solution, it has resulted in more than seventy years of peace.

Another criticism that I sometimes hear is that I minimize the role of Russian aggression. Again, I disagree. I have always pointed out that the invasion of Ukraine is a violation of international law, but my study of Ukrainian history leads me to conclude that, while Russia initiated the current level of hostilities, their roots go much, much deeper. Understanding this complex history does not in any way minimize, mitigate, or justify Russia’s attack on Ukraine. It is however, vital for the healing of Ukrainian society, and for achieving a lasting peace.

Cover photo: Nicolai N. Petro (Photo: Screenshot)