A few days ago, my colleague Dr. Balint Somkuti published an article titled Warfare, the Russian Way. In response to this study, “standing on the shoulders of giants,” I will attempt to take a broader view and examine Russia's attritional warfare through the lens of quantitative analysis.
For centuries, Russia’s wars have been shaped by a distinct strategic culture, influenced by geography, history, and political necessity. Unlike Western doctrines, which focus on precision, flexibility, and quick decision-making, the Russian model of warfare emphasizes attrition, mass mobilization, and endurance. This strategy has produced mixed results over the centuries: while Russia has been able to wear down its opponents in prolonged wars, it has faced significant difficulties in conflicts where speed, adaptability, and logistical efficiency were dominant.
Warfare, the Russian Way: Key Characteristics
Mielőtt fejest ugrunk az orosz felőrlő háborúba, érdemes néhány szót szólni az attríció helyéről a többi háború kulcsjellemző koordináta-rendszerében.
Before diving into Russia's attritional warfare, it’s worth discussing the role of attrition within the broader context of key characteristics of other wars.
Russia's worldview of warfare consists of several key elements, with strategic depth, attrition, and flexibility at its core. Historically, Russia's military successes have often relied on the vast expanse of the country and its ability to sustain significant human and material sacrifices in pursuit of victory. The Soviet doctrine of “deep operations” (glubokaya operatsiya) reflects this: they employed layered assaults that gradually wore down the enemy, instead of relying on quick, decisive maneuvers.
This mindset of attritional strategy, with deep roots in Tsarist and Soviet military thought, remains evident in Russia's military operations today.
Strategic deception (maskirovka) is also crucial, encompassing disinformation, psychological warfare, and feigned maneuvers to mislead the enemy. The Russian military still heavily relies on artillery-centered warfare, prioritizing massive artillery concentration over mobility. This echoes the Tsarist/Soviet legacy, made famous in battles such as Borodino and Berlin.
At the same time, the Russian command structure remains centralized, limiting the initiative of lower-ranking officers, which ensures political control but often leads to rigidity on the battlefield. It’s also important to note that Russian military thought is treating war as an integral part of statecraft, integrating military, economic, and political instruments to achieve strategic goals.
Russia's Attritional Wars: Successes and Failures
Russia’s ability to successfully wage attritional wars significantly depends on the duration of the conflict, its proximity to Moscow, and the internal stability of the state. Naturally, there are a range of other, vote-worthy variables, such as the balance between offense and defense, but these are difficult to quantify. A historical overview of Russian attritional wars, considering these three factors, reveals clear patterns. Russia’s most successful attritional wars took place relatively close to its core territories and were drawn-out affairs. These include the Napoleonic invasion (1812), World War II (1941–1945), and numerous Russo-Turkish wars. In these cases, Russian strategy successfully capitalized on the country’s size, harsh climate, and vast resources.
In contrast, the shorter and/or more distant wars — such as the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) or the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) — ended in failure, primarily due to logistical difficulties and internal political instability.
The Tipping Point: When Does War Shift in Russia's Favor?
When analyzing case studies about Russia's attritional warfare, one of the key questions is the concept of tipping point — the moment when the duration of the war starts to favor Russia.
Historically, if a war is short (less than a year), Russia is generally at a disadvantage, as it struggles to react quickly and faces political pressure for a rapid victory. Examples include the Russo-Japanese War, the Crimean War, and the First Chechen War.
However, if the conflict lasts more than two years, Russia’s attritional advantages begin to dominate. Russia’s ability to mobilize, its industrial production, and its use of defensive depth come into play. Examples include World War II, the Second Chechen War, and the current phase of the Ukraine War. If external support for the enemy weakens over time, Russia’s long-term endurance can become a decisive factor.
A second key question in analyzing case studies on Russia's wars of attrition concerns distance. In the context of this study, this refers to the distance from Moscow, which we can reasonably assume plays a critical role in the success of Russia’s suffocating warfare. A review of historical case studies suggests a rule of thumb: conflicts within 800 kilometers of Russia’s core generally result in Russian victory, while wars fought more than 1,500 kilometers away dramatically reduce Russia’s chances of success (such as the Russo-Japanese and Soviet-Afghan Wars).
Conclusions: Under What Conditions Does Russia Typically Win Its Attritional Wars?
Based on historical patterns, Russia generally wins its attritional wars when they take place within its territory or relatively close to it (no further than approximately 800 kilometers from Moscow), last more than two years, and the opponent does not receive sustained external support.
Conversely, Russia typically loses when the war is fought far from its borders, when a decisive victory is required in a short period, or when facing a well-supported, strong adversary (as seen in the Crimean War). These numbers, of course, shouldn’t be measured with precision, as various intermediary variables (such as technology) can significantly influence the final outcomes. However, when applied flexibly, these numbers can offer valuable insights, grounded in historical case studies.
The current war in Ukraine, prima facie, fits neatly into this pattern. In the short term, the failure of maneuver-based warfare at the perimeter of a near-800-kilometer "magic circle" (Kyiv and Kherson), followed by long-term success through artillery-based attritional warfare within the "magic circle," mirrors this historical pattern. So what does all this mean for the future?
It suggests that as long as Russia avoids the overextension trap and does not try to reach beyond the “magic circle,” history’s patterns strongly indicate that time is working in its favor.
The author is a security policy expert at the Center for Fundamental Rights and a senior contributor at our newspaper.
