Robert C. Castel: Europe’s Security Paradoxes

European leaders are sinking deeper and deeper into the quagmire of geopolitical vulnerability and escalation.

A NATO-központ épülete Brüsszelben Forrás: Anadolu/AFP

If Europe's security strategy had to be summed up in a single sentence, it would be: "We do everything to ensure our safety while simultaneously doing everything to put ourselves in even greater danger."

In recent years, the continent has been slipping deeper into a geopolitical trap where measures taken for defense end up escalating the very threats they were meant to counter.

This is not a new phenomenon but rather one of the many recurring security paradoxes that persist with monotonous reliability.

While Europe’s political elite has declared increasing the continent’s security a priority, the unintended consequences of their actions have created/will create new vulnerabilities, new conflicts, and even greater strategic exposure.

The belief that "more defense = greater security" is just as misleading as the economic fallacy that "higher taxes = greater prosperity." European leaders talk about strategic autonomy while sinking deeper into the quagmire of geopolitical vulnerability and escalation.

Let’s examine the security paradoxes that lurk like hastily placed landmines beneath Europe’s defense strategies.

Security Paradoxes

The first and most striking of these is the classic security dilemma—a concept that dates back to Thucydides. In his account of the Peloponnesian War, Athens, a rising naval power, sought to expand its influence (e.g., by forcing the neutral island of Melos into submission) to secure its empire and deter Sparta. However, Sparta, fearing Athens’ growing power, built up its own alliances and military forces. Both sides, acting out of fear of the other's intentions, armed themselves—ultimately leading to war.

Thucydides famously wrote:
"The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable." (Book I, 23)

In response to Russian aggression, the EU has embarked on massive modernization and rearmament programs, purchasing new military technology and strengthening transatlantic security cooperation under the Biden administration. These efforts have been accompanied by an increasingly confrontational rhetoric. However, this has not gone unnoticed. Moscow now views these actions as a direct threat and has responded by deploying new weapons systems and reconfiguring its nuclear doctrine.

Instead of deterrence, tensions have escalated. The arms race has accelerated, and rather than becoming stronger, Europe has become more vulnerable. The EU is now drifting ever closer to a war scenario it originally sought to prevent.

Another paradox is Europe’s geopolitical dependence on the United States. For decades, the continent’s security architecture has relied on Washington’s military umbrella. Each time the idea of developing independent European defense capabilities is raised, a political panic ensues. The result is a strategic reality where

 Europe is nominally independent but in practice entirely dependent on the fluctuations of U.S. foreign policy. NATO membership guarantees security but also entails risks—since the EU is, to a large extent, automatically drawn into America's global conflicts, regardless of whether they align with European interests.

From the U.S. perspective, it is only natural to expect loyalty in return for decades of "free" security. For decades, NATO might have seemed like a free lunch—after all, who would dare draw a sword against the world’s most powerful military alliance? But in recent years, it has become clear that a military alliance is not a charity, and sooner or later, the price must be paid. The dependency paradox is this: while security is provided by a great patron or alliance, where security is shared, so too are the threats and risks.

A third paradox is the defense paradox: a state strong enough to protect its citizens from all threats is also strong enough to take everything from them.

Similarly, an EU collective security apparatus that becomes powerful enough to deter Russia could also become powerful enough to militarily coerce unwilling member states.

This paradox is not new, either. Even the prophet Samuel warned the Hebrews about this old truth when they demanded a king.

Can Europe avoid these paradoxes and create security without falling into these entirely predictable traps? Can we, like the wise girl in the Hungarian folk tale about King Mathias, "come and not come, give and not give"?

One potential answer is the Non-Offensive Defense (NOD) concept.

The Concept and Application of Non-Offensive Defense (NOD)

Non-Offensive Defense (NOD) is a military strategy focused on effective territorial defense without offensive capabilities. Its goal is to: enhance stability, reduce security dilemmas and promote arms control and disarmament.

The core principle of NOD is to structure armed forces in a way that makes clear that we can defend our national territory, but we lack the capability to conduct offensive operations.

NOD can be defined both structurally and functionally: structurally – by shaping the military’s posture and technology, and functionally – by limiting military operations to purely defensive roles. NOD is not a binary concept, but a spectrum, with states at various points along the continuum.
One of the main objectives of NOD is to address the security dilemma. As mentioned above, in the international system, it is often the case that the defense build-up of one state can be interpreted as offense capabilities by others, which can lead to competition in terms of quantity and quality of arms. NOD seeks to reduce this risk by putting military capabilities in the exclusive service of defense.

A key principle of NOD is "defensive sufficiency"—meaning military forces should be strong enough to defend national territory but should not develop offensive capabilities.

 This also points to the need for a clear distinction between attack and defense. Although it is difficult to draw a precise line at the level of individual weapon systems, the distinction is more prominent at higher levels of military aggregation.

This distinction helps reduce arms races and prevent perceived threats from triggering preemptive military responses.

Where’s the Catch?
If NOD is such a simple solution, why has the concept practically disappeared from defense policy discussions? Primarily because the effetive application of NOD poses a number of challenges.

The biggest challenge is defining and verifying what counts as offensive or defensive capabilities. Some systems, for example, missiles and fighter jets are difficult to classify as strictly defensive or offensive. 

Similarly, air and naval forces are also difficult to categorize. They are traditionally seen as offensive, so special mechanisms would be needed to ensure they serve only defensive purposes.

Another major issue is political will and trust. NOD’s effectiveness depends on how credibly other nations perceive a state's defensive posture.

But mistrust and perceived threats can undermine even the best-intentioned defensive strategies.

Ironically, NOD itself has created its own paradox: The greater the need for the tension reduction NOD can ensure, the less the necessary trust needed to implement it exists.

The author is an expert on security policy at the Center for Fundamental Rights, and a senior staffer at Magyar Nemzet.