Ex-Ambassador to Ukraine: Viktor Orban Conspicuously Absent from Kyiv

Istvan Ijgyarto, Hungary's former ambassador to Kiev and earlier to Moscow, urges caution regarding the new Ukrainian law on minorities. The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs researcher warned that it is not enough for Ukraine to pass new legislation in assembly line fashion for EU accession, the changes must also reach the deeper fabric of society. Magyar Nemzet asked the expert to assess Ukraine-Hungary relations.

20230516 Budapest Íjgyártó István diplomata Fotó: Mirkó István MI Magyar Nemzet Fotó: Mirkó István

In his annual year-end speech, Volodymyr Zelensky said that relations with Hungary are not always friendly and that he would like to meet with Viktor Orban to iron out differences. Do you see any chance of that happening next year?

Hungary has never shied away from such a meeting. In fact, our position has been that it would be important, but only if the talks bear substance. In the mean time, the list of issues requiring resolution keep growing. 

It often seemed that Kyiv was only willing to make political gestures at most, in order to be able to "check off" items on a list, like having met with all European leaders, except that Viktor Orban was conspicuously absent from this list. 

We don't have the impression that they are really willing to discuss issues of importance to Hungary and to Hungarians. So this is why a top-level meeting has stalled; the problem is not one of receptiveness.

How did Ukrainian politics and media view the Hungarian abstention and veto at the EU summit?

This EU summit was particularly important for Kyiv as they needed some political success instead of the only promised military victories. With no assurance of NATO membership, they needed some positive feedback at least from the European Union that their efforts were being appreciated. In and of itself, that wouldn't be a problem. The question is rather: on the one hand, is Ukraine truly ready to start negotiations and, on the other, is the European Union also prepared to do so, and furthermore all this in the middle of an ongoing war? In the end, a clearly political decision was made, and Hungary did not stand in the way. As far as the Ukrainian reaction is concerned, Kyiv also realized that they could not solely blame Hungary for this situation, as other member states also raised their doubts. In my opinion, Ukrainian public opinion is much more sober now than it was before.

They understand the weight of the issues on the agenda and consequently the accusatory and offensive tone has been dropped. I instead sense some desperation.

When would EU accession be realistic?

The Ukrainian elite has been on this path since 2014. Their choice is clear: rejecting the old Soviet world and opting for Europe instead. However, the situation has changed a lot since then, for example, before the war broke out, NATO membership was not supported by the majority. But Ukrainians are convinced that joining the EU would solve most of their problems and bring some kind of prosperity to the people. EU policy has also allowed them to get a taste of what membership would include, for example, by concluding a free trade agreement and having visa-free travel. That said, Ukrainian society would still have to undergo a huge transformation to be ready for membership. This is still very distant in terms of time. 

The Ukrainian leadership's perspective is erroneous, as the assembly line-fashion production of new legislation does not make up for actual change trickling down into the deeper fabric of society.

Speaking of assembly line-produced laws: how do you assess the new rules on minorities?

What has happened now is that Kyiv has addressed with an amendment package the criticisms coming from the West - mainly Hungary, of course. This course correction has been partly successful, but there are still gaps in some very important areas. One of the most unfortunate measures was the gradual switch in upper secondary schools to teaching exclusively in Ukrainian language, but this has been repealed. Now only three subjects: Ukrainian language and literature, Ukrainian history and national defense have to be taught in Ukrainian, which is an acceptable compromise. Although, there is a provision for schools to decide to extend these further. This loophole means that if a majority-led institution decides to do so, the previous situation would return in a heartbeat. A few other questions remain open: for example, do minorities have the right to operate schools? The issue of public minority language use, i.e. people being able to communicate with state and local authorities in their own language, hasn't been settled. Or why shouldn't an ethnic Hungarian-majority municipal government in Transcarpathia be able to hold its meetings in Hungarian? In many contexts, the new Ukrainian law was seen as a huge step forward. 

I would urge caution. The minority issue has been raised to a higher level again, but I would not yet call that progress. The extremely bad situation has improved somewhat, but we are still not at the point where we were before.

The appointed new Ukrainian ambassador to Budapest was approved five months ago, but has still not arrived. How unusual is this in diplomacy?

The when and how of sending an ambassador  is the sovereign decision of the sending country. The host country has no say in this. Under the rules governing the procedure, the host country only declares whether it will receive the specific individual. This has already happened, and it is now up to Kyiv to ascertain the suitability of the candidate and the way in which he or she has been prepared. I do not know what to make of the delay in the process, so we wait.

This year, no real results were seen on either side on the battlefield. What do you expect on the fronts?

It is difficult to make predictions because the situation has changed dramatically in recent months. The much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed, and the Russians appear to have restored the front line to the starting point and may well push on. Even Kyiv is already articulating that instead of liberating territory and restoring the '91 borders, they are trying to set up an active defense. This strategy is easier on the budget and on the people. 

Ukraine has already proven that it can successfully defend itself, so the war is heading towards being a kind of frozen conflict.

By the same token, the Russians may try to bring the matter to a conclusion, and may stand a chance against a tired and depleted Ukrainian army. What is certain is that there are already two defeated parties in this war: Ukraine and Russia. After all, the fallen cannot be resurrected, and the losses will be very difficult to replace.

Cover photo: Istvan Ijgyarto, former ambassador to Kiev and Moscow, researcher at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (Photo: Istvan Mirko)