- The Sovereignty Protection Office has been operating for over a year now. Magyar Nemzet spoke with its president, Tamas Lanczi, about the experiences and results so far.
- After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the United States created a new system for exerting influence, essentially embedding agent organizations within the media and civil society.
- A kind of gray zone emerged that remained outside the purview of both politics and intelligence services for a long time.
- The Sovereignty Protection Office has examined nearly 300 organizations suspected of exerting pressure in Hungary using foreign funds.
- This is a four-tiered system, with state donors at the top—partly American and partly Brussels-based funds that manage public money.
- Between 2022 and 2024, a total of 23 billion forints flowed into Hungary: 3.5 billion from USAID and 19.5 billion allocated by the European Commission to political pressure groups in Hungary.
- In Hungary, the Okotars Foundation is one of the key fund distribution organizations, along with eight similar entities.
- The DatAdat group has both the intent and the capability to assist the opposition challenger in the 2026 elections.
- The Sovereignty Protection Office continuously monitors the activities of the Tisza Party, which runs fundraising platforms.
- From the perspective of Hungarian sovereignty, it is irrelevant whether someone identifies with foreign interests. By accepting money from foreign powers to amplify political opinions or spread disinformation narratives, they are interfering in Hungary’s democratic processes.
Why was it necessary to establish an office for protecting Hungary’s sovereignty when numerous authorities and state institutions are already in place to safeguard the country's independence?
After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, an entirely new security situation emerged in the Euro-Atlantic region. The United States had purposefully prepared for the scenario in which the Soviet Union would disappear from the equation, and developed an entirely new method of influence. This method involved embedding agent organizations primarily within the media and civil society. Western states never even hid this fact. They openly stated that since the early 1990s, numerous organizations had been established in former communist bloc countries, including Hungary, which describe themselves as civil society groups or independent media but in fact, operate in line with foreign interests.
This process started even before the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall. For example, George Soros’s foundation had already established a foothold in Hungary in the 1980s, and similar NGOs were active across Western Europe as well.
That’s correct. The preparation and testing of this new model had already begun, but it was only set in motion at this scale and with such resources when the Cold War years were over. Following this, a gray zone emerged that remained outside the purview of both politics and intelligence services for a long time. This is the space these organizations pushed into, and since the 1990s, they have been operating highly effectively in Hungary, as well as in many parts of Europe and the world. They enjoy the freedoms granted to organizations in the civil society sector but at the same time they are clearly engaged in political activity. The Sovereignty Protection Office was established to uncover this gray zone, identify the organizations involved, and investigate their funding and operational structures. The changes in the United States and the stance of the new administration have provided enormous momentum, as this issue is no longer just something we talk about—now the US leadership itself is exposing and publicly disclosing these matters.
How deeply have you managed to uncover the activities of this foreign-funded network in Hungary?
So far, we have examined nearly 300 organizations suspected of exerting pressure in Hungary using foreign funds. The network has focal points that coordinate and direct its operations. One of the most important ones we have investigated in detail is the Okotars Foundation. This is an aggregator organization tasked with receiving foreign funds intended for political pressure and redistributing them to organizations with links to the network. At the end of the funding pipeline, we find activist groups and propaganda sites. A prime example of the former is Transparency International, which systematically attempts to damage Hungary’s reputation internationally and played a significant role in Brussels’ financial blackmail against Hungary. An example of the latter is Atlatszo, which, in reality, engages in intelligence-gathering activities funded from abroad. It is no coincidence that we began our investigations with these organizations.
What specific political pressure activities do these organizations engage in?
We have uncovered disinformation narratives—many are attempting to manipulate Hungarian public discourse in line with foreign interests. We have also identified specific programs funded by the European Union and the United States to this end. Primarily, we are dealing with influence operations from Brussels and Washington, but we have also uncovered Russian pro-war narratives. It is also important to mention our report from a year ago, which focused on the 2022 elections. On the platform X, short video excerpts were published, the full documentation of which we have obtained. In these videos, both Hungarian and foreign actors involved in the abuse seen during the election openly discussed how their network remains active and ready to influence Hungarian public life and future elections.
In your recently published summary, it is mentioned that American and European government funds amounting to 23 billion Hungarian forints have been sent to Hungary between 2022 and February 2025. Are there any specific details about who the main foreign donors are?
To start with, it's important to clarify the structure of the financing model. It’s a four-tiered system, with state donors at the top, including American and Brussels-based funds that manage public money. The best-known among these is USAID, but there are other similar organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy. The European equivalents include programs such as the CERV run by the European Commission. There are numerous such programs. These are multi-billion euro funds that the Commission uses to finance pressure groups across Europe. On the second level, there are the financial aggregator organizations, where the "privatization" of public funds occurs, such as the German Marshall Fund or the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and the flagship, George Soros's Open Society Foundations. The funds are then channeled from these large centers to organizations like the Okotars Foundation, mentioned earlier, with another eight similar funding organizations operating in Hungary. These are the organizations where the funds are cloaked as domestic resources. The fourth level consists of the end-users who implement the programs, with the key objectives being strengthening the pro-war stance, LGBTQ sensitization, supporting migration, promoting drug liberalization, and implementing disinformation campaigns related to corruption.
What is the breakdown of the 23 billion forints in terms of the origin of the funds?
3.5 billion forints came from USAID between 2022 and 2024, which would have been much more if Donald Trump had not halted payments. The European Commission, from its own programs, allocated 19.5 billion forints to political pressure groups in Hungary.
Going back to the 300 organizations identified so far, is it possible that most of them are unaware of the financial machinations?
Let's be fair, some of them may not be aware that they are part of a global-scale progressive influence attempt from the US. But if someone looks into the source of funding from organizations like Okotars, it immediately becomes clear that the money comes from public funds from the US and Brussels. However, being unaware that they are part of a large international network doesn't make their activities any less dangerous, and it doesn't absolve them.
The public is not very familiar with the working methods of the Sovereignty Protection Office. What kind of information can you request, for example, from the intelligence services?
I would refer back to the beginning of our conversation. When the United States established this new kind of influence system in 1991, a journalist from the Washington Post, David Ignatius – who was presumably also a member of the American intelligence community – wrote in an article that we are living in the age of open operations. He revealed that everything the US previously carried out through the CIA or other national security agencies is now largely executed by the aforementioned foundations and organizations, which operate openly. So today, a lot of data and information is accessible from open sources, and only recently have these organizations begun to hide their activities, as they see that their work has not been widely welcomed around the world. Interestingly, the greatest secrecy is found in Brussels. After 2018, the European Commission became the main funder, meaning that most of the funding for political pressure groups in Hungary now comes from Brussels. Along with open data, we can also request information from the National Information Center.
Has your office ever contacted the National Information Center with an information request about the current activities of the business circle behind DatAdat, which ran the left-wing campaign with billions of dollars in funding from the US?
This is not public information, so I cannot comment.
The question arises because Adam Ficsor, an owner in DatAdat – who was the intelligence minister in the left-wing government of Gordon Bajnai – has now appeared in a Brussels-based organization, the European Center for Digital Action, whose main focus is online campaigning and fundraising.
I can only repeat my previous answer.
The DatAdat and the Brussels organization just mentioned could become active in 2026, for example, supporting the campaign of the Tisza Party.
The intention and the capability are there, and the group has stated that they are ready for this.
You’ve repeatedly mentioned political pressure, which undermines our sovereignty. But how can it be determined what counts as such an activity and what constitutes genuine civil society activity?
This is a sham debate. Everyone can clearly distinguish civil society activity from political pressure. A fishing association can be easily distinguished from, say, a Soros organization. The latter organizes protests, publishes propaganda materials, produces discrediting content, and spreads disinformation narratives. Every Hungarian has the right to shape politics, but the problem begins when they do this on foreign orders and with foreign money. This already undermines the democratic will-formation of Hungary.
There has been talk of the European Commission’s secrecy, and the same applies to some domestic organizations and media outlets, such as Atlatszo or Transparency. Is there any instrument the office can rely on to enforce the disclosure of concealed data?
This would require changes to the current legislation. In France, for example, this would entail a heavy fine or even imprisonment.
So far, we have talked a lot about public exposure, about how, despite the secrecy, this pressure system is being mapped out in more and more detail. That is obviously important, but the crucial question is: how can the Hungarian state act against foreign influence to prevent a repeat of the abuse seen during the 2022 election?
The office has both the right and the obligation to make recommendations to the government whenever it identifies a sovereignty risk. The essence of our recommendations is that a clear distinction must be made between organizations engaged in public life and those involved in genuine civil society activities.
How can they be distinguished? Will you put a label on the organizations?
The final decision belongs to the legislature. What is certain is that the game these organizations have been playing since the regime change—hiding political activity behind a civil society facade while financed with foreign funds—must come to an end. The loopholes that have made all this possible need to be closed. We have also made proposals to the decision-makers in this regard, but it is equally important to ensure that the laws can be enforced.
What loopholes currently exist?
One loophole is donations, those so-called donation boxes, where bundles of dollars or euros were stacked in sequential order. Another method is the operation of anonymous donation platforms, which are also suitable for hiding foreign funding. These also require legislative changes.
The Tisza Party mentioned earlier also claims that it operates from donations from its supporters. Could this raise the suspicion that foreign money is flowing to Peter Magyar and his party?
All that I can say is that we continuously monitor these processes.
Based on your experience so far, do you see the need to tighten the Sovereignty Protection Act and expand the powers of the office?
What matters to me is that the Hungarian state can effectively counter influence attempts.
Recently, you got into a heated street argument with some journalists, notably from 444 and Telex, who fiercely questioned you about why you label them as media outlets that are largely funded from abroad. Is there information on how much foreign funding these two outlets have received?
Significant amounts have flowed to them. Moreover, the company owning the 444 portal is 28 per cent in American hands. This overseas co-owner even has veto rights in key issues, such as the appointment of the editor-in-chief. Their publisher, Magyar Jeti Zrt., has created a well-structured network that hides the real ownership interests. And perhaps most importantly, it is entirely clear that they operate according to foreign interests.
At the same time, it is possible that the journalists questioning you are not even aware of the financial background of their media outlets. Colleagues from opposition media often claim that they work according to their own opinions and convictions.
I have never questioned that there are enthusiastic agents, journalists, activists, or politicians. Of course, I have a moral judgment on those who, as Hungarians, serve foreign interests. From the perspective of Hungary's sovereignty, it makes no difference whether someone identifies with foreign interests. By accepting money from foreign powers to amplify political opinions or spread disinformation narratives, they interfere in Hungary's democratic processes. It may well be that someone, as a Hungarian, identifies with the interests of a foreign empire or an economic or political power group, but this does not absolve them morally—or legally in the future, I hope.
Tamas Lanczi was born on November 17, 1978, in Budapest. He graduated in 2003 from the Faculty of Political Science and Law at Eotvos Lorond University as a political scientist. Afterwards, he taught political science as a lecturer at Szazadveg Political School, the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Pazamany Peter Catholic University, and the University of Theatre and Film Arts. From 2020 to the end of 2023, he was the director of the PROKON College for Political Science. Between 2001 and 2002, he was a member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet. From 2002 to 2010, he worked for the parliamentary group of Fidesz. In 2010–2011, he served as chief of staff and deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. Afterwards, for seven years, he was the director of the Center for Political Analyses of the Szazadveg Foundation. From 2015 until recently, he was managing director of Danube Business Consulting Ltd. Between 2017 and 2019, he was the editor-in-chief of the weekly magazine Figyelo, then director of the 21st Century Institute. From 2020 until January 2024, he served as online director of MTVA and host of the public affairs program '48 Minutes'. Since February 1, 2024, he has been the president of the Sovereignty Protection Office.
Cover photo: Tamas Lanczi, president of the Sovereignty Protection Office (Photo: Sandor Csudai)
