Romanian President Klaus Iohannis will pay an official visit to Hungary on Wednesday and will meet with Hungarian President Katalin Novak, who visited Bucharest barely a month ago. The last time such a high-level meeting took place between the Romanian and Hungarian sides was in 2009, which is hardly surprising given the two countries' fraught past and political differences. However, the slowly improving relations are good news for Hungarians both within and beyond Hungary's border, and also serve Hungary's economic and political interests. After the the Socialist era's self-abnegating "let's dare to be small" policy, the national-minded government's foreign policy, with a primary focus on Hungarian interests, appears to come to fruition incrementally.
The most memorable is perhaps the opening stages of the socialist's failed, self-abnegating foreign policy, a moment in 2002 when Peter Medgyessy, as newly elected socialist prime minister, toasted his Romanian counterpart on December 1, when Romania celebrates the annexation of Transylvania.The gaffe has caused considerable outcry both in Hungary and beyond its borders, and rightly so, because it was a direct continuation of Janos Kadar's policy, which almost compulsively denied the existence of Hungarian national interests. The act, which ex-PM Medgyessy defends ever since, is a perfect example of the empty leftist gesture politics typical of the period: did it bring the slightest improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations?
In the realm of foreign policy, gestures and symbols are important, but expecting these alone to bring an improvement in relations is a mistake. In the absence of precisely defined and consistently represented values, our relations with Romania could only improve to the detriment of Hungary under the Medgyessy and later Gyurcsany governments. Joining the EU would have offered a perfect time frame for settling our affairs and negotiating concessions for ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary's borders, but the government at that time failed to seize this opportunity. In 2010, however, after a sweeping electoral victory by the national side, Hungary adopted a completely different approach in foreign policy. This, of course, led to more confrontation with our neighbors, but it also enhanced respect for the Hungarian state. Fico, with his initial anti-Hungarian outbursts, has slowly tamed into a friend of the Hungarian government, and such a close relationship developed with Serbia that no one would have imagined a few decades earlier.
But let's take a look at the interests that make it important to have such high-level meetings with Romania.
The first and foremost is the interests of ethnic Hungarians, which has already been referred to in this writing. Because of the substantial support they receive from Hungary, they are often accused of not being loyal citizens of their state but the agents of Budapest. This suspicion has been poisoning relations with neighboring countries for decades. By maintaining close relations with the governments of other countries in the Carpathian Basin, the Hungarian state can prevent such unfounded accusations and ensure that the interests of ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary are represented. We can see this now in the case of Ukraine, where the national government is taking a tough and consistent stand for restoring the minority rights Transcarpathia Hungarians have been stripped of. Romania can also be a partner in this issue, as there are large ethnic Romanian communities in certain parts of Ukraine, and they are also affected by the unjust regulations Kyiv's introduced.
The representation of ethnic Hungarians has been a steadfast mission of the Hungarian right since the regime change: first Jozsef Antall stated that in spirit, he wanted to be the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians. Then Hungary's Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 also affirmed that the country, with the cohesion of the united Hungarian nation in mind, bears responsibility for its ethnic Hungarian communities living in neighboring countries, supports the preservation of their Hungarian identity, prosperity in their homeland and the assertion of their rights.
This perhaps is the most important interest in a national aspect. However, in terms of Hungary's prosperity, there are a number of economic interests where the country would only benefit from having good relations with Romania. Perhaps Hungary's energy security is the most vital issue: the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the flawed sanctions Brussels imposed in response have disproportionately affected our region, since our geographical location implies that there is no alternative to Russian energy sources. We have managed to make up for the lost volumes through agreements with Azerbaijan, but the easiest way to trade with this non-neighboring Caucasian country is via the Black Sea, and thus Romania. Both Azeri electricity and Azeri natural gas can only reach our country through Romanian intermediaries. It is therefore particularly important to build adequate infrastructure between the two countries.
Somewhat more abstract, but at least as important is Romania's eventual accession to the Schengen area – provided it does not collapse due to migration – which could open up new economic prospects for the region.
It is no coincidence that the Netherlands is blocking Romania's accession with all in its power, although Bucharest meets all the conditions: the port of Constanza, as one of the gateways of European trade, could easily replace Rotterdam.
This would significantly shift the EU's economic center of gravity towards the Eastern member states. Related to this is the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU as a common Hungarian-Romanian interest, because this would virtually unite Central and Eastern Europe and especially the Danube region in one block after being divided since World War One. The Danube has been the region's economic engine for centuries, and if the above were to happen, the river would once again assume a very important economic role.
It is worth noting that the problems Hungary and Romania face are similar in many respects: there is, for example, the issue of the demographic ice age. Although Hungarian liberals like to portray the fact that people are taking advantage of EU opportunities and working abroad as something peculiar to Hungary, this affects around twenty percent of Romania's population. Meanwhile, the willingness to have children is also decreasing at our eastern neighbor, where no demographic turnaround has taken place.
