Brussels Supports Russia-Ukraine War

Since the start of the Russian invasion, until the writing of this article, the European Union and its member states have provided over EUR 143 billion in economic, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. Now, the latest news is about how and in what form the pro-war Left in Brussels can send troops to Ukraine, whether through NATO or under the authority of member states. By contrast, Hungary has consistently represented a pro-peace stance from the start.

2024. 05. 13. 17:18
Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission in Bucha near Kyiv on April 8, 2022. For more than a month, the district of Bucha was under the control of the Russian forces attacking Ukraine (Photo: MTI/EPA/European Commission/Christophe Licoppe)
VéleményhírlevélJobban mondva - heti véleményhírlevél - ahol a hét kiemelt témáihoz fűzött személyes gondolatok összeérnek, részletek itt.

The route here, just as with the migration issue, has been without consulting the citizenry and also without the full agreement between states. Brussels is pro-war, and its actions prove it.

Brüsszel háborús pszichózisban
Brussels in full war psychosis (Photo: ANP - Jonas Roosens / ANP MAG / ANP via AFP)

At first it was just about sending helmets, then about sanctions - but of course, not on energy carriers, then, yes, on those as well. Then came transfers of arms: initially firearms, then tanks, then planes. Financial aid was next: multiple packages of tens of billions. The count currently totals around a hundred billion euros. Funding, vehicles and weapons have been supplied but the situation is getting worse instead of better. We are one step away from the West sending soldiers to Ukraine. This is a war vortex that could drag Europe into the abyss,

Prime Minister Viktor Orban summarized in a social media post the progression of the process, which are worth examining step by step.

 

Did Viktor Orban foresee the Brussels future vis-a-vis Russian-Ukrainian war?

The Hungarian PM has represented a pro-peace stance from the very beginning. Soon after the Russian invasion began in February 2022, he made an attempt to localize the conflict in order to calm Brussels's bellicose mood. He referred to the conflict as a "fraternal war between Slavic peoples" and advocated the approach already tried in 2014. Back then, the Crimean conflict remained a Ukrainian-Russian conflict, with former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European leaders at the time refusing to let it "escalate and drawn us all into it", as Viktor Orban said during a panel discussion with the heads of German weekly Cicero in Berlin. 

And of course the "what if?" question does not do us much good while we are feeling the effects of the conflict in our daily lives, but the idea of what kind of Europe we would be living in today if the conflict had been isolated is worth a thought experiment. But in reality, in its absence, the EU has taken the wrong, and from the outset the 'Ukraine OR Russia' narrative has dominated EU thinking, and not the imposition of peace as soon as possible. This approach to prolonging the war is also reflected in statements such as pro-war Ursula von der Leyen's "conviction" that "Ukraine will prevail and that Europe will stand with you every step of the way, through thick and thin" or that "we cannot let Russia win". Thinking in terms of who should win or not win does not put the attainment of peace in the most desirable position. It is telling that in the quotes from speeches by the European Commission president, the word 'peace' was not mentioned once, but at most referred to peace as a 'shattered illusion'. The logic of war dominates in Brussels.

But we can also recall from among the endless list of pro-war declarations, that of Frans Timmermans, serving as executive vice-president of the European Commission until the fall of 2023, who said following the outbreak of the war that decisions should be taken that hurt the Russian side, even if they hurt the European Union. While no member state would question the responsibility of the aggressor in the war, the EU leadership's strategy is not determined by a desire for peace or by putting the community's own interests first. It seems that pro-war politicians in Brussels would sacrifice everything for the sake of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

 

Step one: Brussels entices Ukraine with helmets and hope of EU membership

In January 2022, when Russian troops were already massing in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, former German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht spoke out in support of the German government's decision against sending lethal weapons to Ukraine.

The German government has made it clear that we do not send arms to crisis zones because we do not want to further fuel the conflicts there. I think that is the right way to go in this case, as well,

Lambrecht argued back then, on which for a very brief time there was agreement at EU level. The minister added that Germany would show its solidarity by sending 5,000 military helmets to Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian embassy;.

It was around this time that famous investigative pieces such as those put out by Bloombergor Washington Post revealed that the Russian military industry was practically surviving entirely on semiconductor chips extracted from dishwashers and refrigerators. 

Among EU institution leaders, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, was the first to visit Kyiv, which took place on April 1, 2022. The EP president made three promises to Ukraine: holding the aggressor accountable, confirming that the institution she chairs will support Ukraine in its EU candidate status and finally, that the EU will take care of Ukrainian refugees. It did not take long for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to also pay a visit to the Ukrainian president. One of the faces of the West's pro-war policies visited the country later that month. The recurring themes of such meetings were support and EU membership for Ukraine, in fact, Zelensky signed the country's application for EU membership on February 28, 2022, soon after the war started.

However, EU enlargement with Ukraine has proved to be a very sensitive issue.

Partly because, since the beginning of the process, there have been doubts as to whether Ukraine fulfills any of the conditions for membership. The Copenhagen criteria set complex expectations for those wishing to join. Political requirements include the existence of a stable democracy and the rule of law, while economic requirements include a functioning and competitive market economy. In addition to these, it also sets out a more abstract expectation that enlargement should be carried out in such a way that the level of European integration is not diminished. These criteria identify the problem itself. The economy of a country at war is rarely described in analyses as competitive and sustainable. But now, under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), "any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union".

Article 2 of the Treaty states that "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities".

The fact that the Ukrainian law on minorities not only fails to solve the situation of the indigenous Hungarian minority, which has been continuously disenfranchised since 2015, according to the Presidency of the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transcarpathia (KMKSZ), but was even criticised by the Venice Commission. The other key issue in Ukraine is the high level of corruption. As was known before the outbreak of the war, Ukraine was ranked 34th out of 193 countries in the world in the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) crime index, and third worst in Europe. On the other hand, it was ranked 59th out of 180 countries in Transparency International's corruption ranking in 2021 and 65th worst in 2022. So it is with such a track record that Ukraine started on the path to EU accession, on which it has been speeding along ever since, while the Western Balkan countries are being forced to stand and wait. In terms of time, Albania since 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2016, Montenegro since 2008, North Macedonia since 2005, Serbia since 2009 have been in line to become members of the European Union.

 

Step Two: Brussels applies sanctions to bring Russia to its knees

One symptom of the flawed Brussels strategy is the sanctions policy. The first package of sanctions against Russia was adopted in February 2022, shortly after the invasion. This package did not yet contain elements that would have directly hurt the EU's own member states, as it did not extend to sensitive areas. The first package targeted the Russian state and government's ability to access EU capital and financial markets and services, and specific individuals were also included on the sanctions list. By contrast, already congruently with the first package, Brussels started communicating that the most effective way to corner Russia economically was through the energy sector. Iconic imprints of this thinking were seen when Brussels proposals were circulated on how to reduce the energy consumption of European citizens.

Along these lines, the themes of Frans Timmermans's opinion and his negotiations, which European citizens may remember hearing, called for room temperatures of 15 degrees Celsius being sufficient at night, and that Europeans not wash their clothes, but rather just air them.

The second package of sanctions already included energy sector sanctions, banning the sale of certain refined oil refinery-related goods and technologies to Russia. Communication became emboldened and the stated aim became weaning the EU of Russian energy supplies. This proposal did not make it to the negotiating table, so the focus was narrowed at EU headquarters: liquefied natural gas (LNG) became the new target. Even ACER, the EU's energy regulator, objected. The organization warned in April 2024 that cutting off imports of Russian LNG would lead to a supply crisis in the Bloc. According to the latest news, negotiations are on track to exempt LNG supplies to the EU from upcoming sanctions, but only to ban the possibility of further exports. 

However, the sanctions packages - currently thirteen sanctions have been adopted in Brussels - can only serve as means of attempting to strengthen a European identity from time to time, as they have obviously failed to have the economic impact on Russia that was hoped for. Everyone has a narrative as to why sanctions do not work. For a long time, Brussels has been telling us that the sanctions are working, but that we need more of them and that we have to wait, because they have a long-term effect. This narrative was unquestionably broken by German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in September 2023.

Economic sanctions should have an economic impact. But this is not the case. Because the logic of democracies does not work in autocracies,

the Green Party foreign affairs minister managed to say. Thanks to this sanctions approach, Germany's economy is expected to grow by 0.2 percent in 2024, while Russia's is expected to grow by 3.2 percent. 

Less politically-motivated explanations see the hopelessness of sanctions in Russia's ability to restructure its economic activity. Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian imports from China and Turkey have risen sharply. As for their export market, it seems that it is still not difficult to find new buyers when it comes to oil and gas exports.

But Brussels has still not managed to draw any conclusions. At the end of 2023, the EU Special Envoy for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan, said that the sanctions were basically working.

However, if we give credence to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) April 2024 report that Russia's economy will grow more than originally expected this year, then many Brusselsites would have to correct their earlier statements. Indeed, the IMF this week revised up its January forecast for Russia from 2.6 to 3.2 percent. And it already expects growth in Russia to be at least 1.8 per cent next year, up from 1.1 per cent. But it is also clear that the advocates of sanctions themselves do not want to abide by their content. Just a few examples of hypocrisy:

  • Belgium has increased its imports from Russia from 1.9 billion cubic meters in 2022 to 3.1 billion cubic meters, or 63 percent by 2023. This puts it well above the European average, with Belgians sourcing 37 percent of their gas from Russia,
  • Spain, with a consumption of 5.3 billion cubic meters, is became Europe's largest importer of Russian LNG by 2023. This means Spain buys more gas from Russia than Hungary, whose import comes by pipeline,
  • Although France has reduced its purchases of LNG gas - it bought 5.5 billion cubic meters from Russia from January to September 2022, compared to "only" 3.2 billion cubic meters in the same period of 2023 - it has acquired large quantities of recycled uranium from Russia, which is not surprising, since according to an article in the economic daily Vilaggazdasag, it would take more than a decade to break the dependency on Russian recycling,
  • Both nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic will be powered with new generation Russian fuel supplied by the Russian company TVEL. The Czechs expect the procurement to make their operations safer and more efficient,
  • The United States, also very committed to supporting Ukraine, has not stopped trading with Russia either. According to data put out by the US Bureau of Statistics, in the first half of 2023, the US bought 416 tons of enriched uranium from wartime Russia, 2.2 times the 188 tons it bought last year. The last time the US purchased similar amounts of uranium from Russia was in 2005, when it bought 418 tons. The value of the current purchase is approximately seven hundred million dollars, the highest since 2002. At current exchange rates, this is roughly 250 billion forints. With the recent transactions, Russia's share of US imports has increased to 32 percent.

 

Step three: EU arms shipments and becoming an active financier of war

In order to understand how humanitarian aid to Ukraine has morphed into arms shipments, one has to understand the decision-making process. 

In July 2022, a tranche of €490 million from the European Peace Facility - which is supposed to improve the EU's security and defense capabilities - was allocated for "military equipment designed to deliver lethal force for defense purposes".

To date, the EU has sent Ukraine €33 billion in military aid. What's certain is that despite the arms shipments, the war has not stopped, with according to a UN report at the end of 2023 more than 10,000 civilians had been killed since the fighting broke out, and military casualties were estimated at hundreds of thousands.

Funding is therefore channelled through the European Peace Facility and the Ukraine Support Fund set aside within it. The Ukraine Support Fund allows the EU to continue to support the changing needs of the Ukrainian armed forces by providing lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training. On the content of the package and the financial commitment it entails - which would mean a contribution of HUF 23 billion (nearly €59.5 million) over a year for Hungary - Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said that Hungary would not prevent others from supplying arms, but that Hungary would not participate in the move and would not bear any financial burden.

The most audacious declarations, which will finally push the continent to the brink of war, arrived in March 2024.

Today, if we want peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak, so we must see the situation clearly and say firmly, willingly and courageously that we are ready to use all the means at our disposal to achieve our goal, which is to prevent Russia from winning,

Emmanuel Macron said. French opposition politician Florian Philippot wrote on X that Macron is making statements that could justify a nuclear attack. The former MEP continued: "Is he doing it deliberately? Yes, definitely, to further increase tension and fear here! What madness! What irresponsibility!" But beyond the nuclear war atmosphere, there is now an open narrative of sending Western troops into Ukraine. An extraordinary summit was convened in Paris in February this year by the French president to discuss Ukraine's difficult military situation. About the meeting, Politico reported that the head of state said the possibility of sending Western troops to Ukraine should not be ruled out at all. Of course, the French president had his supporters. Lithuania has also come forward, saying it is ready to send troops to Ukraine as part of a training mission, the Financial Times reported, citing Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte.

The Russian response to war escalation pressures came forthwith. On May 6, 2024, the Russian General Staff, under the order of Vladimir Putin, started preparations for the holding of exercises in the near future to test the preparation and deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons .

 

Pro-peace or pro-war? Hungarian opposition in full support of the process

As early as February 2022, Andras Fekete-Gyor, former chairman of the now dying Momentum party, said that Hungary should support Ukraine with arms. Peter Marki-Zay, the former prime ministerial candidate of the unified Left, said about helping Ukraine that "if NATO so decides, we should even send soldiers". 

In April 2022, Bence Tordai, co-chair of the Dialogue Party, said that "it is high time for Hungary to start direct arms transfers". After all this, Ferenc Gyurcsany former leftist PM and current DK party chief himself confirmed the opposition's pro-war stance when he said that "anyone who refuses to die for Ukraine, is lousy person". But left-wing Budapest Mayor Gergely Karacsony, going above and beyond the call of leftists went as far as saying that we are at war with Russia.

These are the pro-war statements that are an imprint of the war pressures in Brussels and with which the opposition and the dangers of war are intertwined. The theme of presenting the true face of the Left features strongly in this year's Fidesz election campaign.

If you think they are at least interested in the peace and security of Hungarians, you are wrong. The dollar Left is admittedly pro-war,

can be heard in the video uploaded to Fidesz's social media page.

PM Viktor Orban also drew attention to the Left's policy of caving in to Brussels. "It is so obvious what Hungary's interests are in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and why it stands where it does," the he said in response to the speeches in the National Assembly by parliamentary group leaders in connection with his parliamentary report. The problem, in his view, is that left-wing politicians think the same way about Ukraine as they do about Hungary, even though they are two different countries. 

The interests of Ukraine can never take precedence over the interests of Hungary, we will not destroy ourselves for the sake of anyone else,

 the prime minister stated, adding that 

the path to peace is a ceasefire.

 

Cover photo: Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission in Bucha near Kyiv on April 8, 2022. For more than a month, the district of Bucha was under the control of the Russian forces attacking Ukraine (Photo: MTI/EPA/European Commission/Christophe Licoppe)

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