You have spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat and policy advisor, including at the CIA. Now you are director of the Grand Strategy Program at the Quincy Institute. So what exactly do you do?
Well, in short, the Quincy Institute is a relatively new think tank that started about five years ago. Its purpose is to promote US foreign policy, advocating greater realism and restraint. Let us restore what is now a lost art in American foreign policy, namely diplomacy, and recognize that the military solution is not the only tool the United States has to rely on in the world.
To that end, we are developing strategic concepts to combat the forces that continue to militarize the United States in its relations with the world. But to pursue an effective foreign policy, these concepts must be coupled with our diplomatic efforts.
There's no denying it, I am in charge of this gigantic-scale strategic program. We even call it the Grand Strategy.
The United States is also very strong and at times likes to show it. Can you tell us what tools can be used in your strategic concepts to avoid militarization?
I think that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has very often relied on military means to promote its foreign policy objectives. Most of the military operations in which we have been directly or indirectly involved have not been successful. We have not achieved the objectives that we set out to achieve, and in fact I think they have had some unintended, counterproductive effects that have actually harmed American foreign policy and American security. So one of the things that we're trying to achieve in our grand strategic agenda is a balance between the goals that the United States is pursuing and the capabilities that we have to achieve them.
I think that when we try to do more in the world than we are actually capable of, our grand strategy is discredited. All that happens is that we get caught up in so-called 'perpetual wars', which we then fail to bring to a successful conclusion. We are also experiencing major budget deficits because we are spending much more than we can in a sustainable way.
So I believe that the United States needs to adjust its foreign policy to follow a course that is more considerate and more closely aligned with our country's most important national interests. We should not seek to turn other countries into the liberal, Western-style democracies that we expect them to be. They can best do this if they do it on their own initiative and not under political and military pressure from the United States.
How important is the opinion of institutions like yours to politicians in the United States?
The influence of the Quincy Institute is growing. However, our perspective is still a minority perspective in Washington. I think the majority in Washington is still very much committed to relying on military means as a primary solution to the problems that we face in the world. This is apparent when we hear US administration officials defining our interests as leading a crusade of good over evil, and dividing the world into democratic and authoritarian states that are always in conflict with each other. This suggests that we are still clinging to ideas that have led to what we have been seeing since the end of the Cold War: these various endless wars, these efforts to transform other countries from within. We have to stop this, if you like, we have to move away from this rigid position.
I think the Quincy Institute's voice of restraint and realism is attracting growing attention in the United States. This is partly reflected in the electoral debates we are seeing among those arguing for a more America-centric, more restrained, less ambitious approach to the world that is more in line with a multipolar world order. It is obvious that the world is becoming more multipolar, and in a situation like this the United States will be one of the powers.
We have to strive for a balance, a balance of power in the world, where these different poles work in a balanced situation in which we all feel comfortable. I believe that a growing number of people in the United States will recognize this reality, which is a new reality, but it is our future.
Wars are raging and tensions are rising around the world. Which of these do you consider the most dangerous and which do you consider the most urgent to resolve?
The biggest challenges we are facing in the world are related to conflicts between the great powers. This is currently taking place in Ukraine. One aspect of this conflict concerns the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine, but the greater and more dangerous part of the conflict is the broader geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO, and Russia and the United States. It is partly the unfinished business of the end of the Cold War, because we have never been able to create a security order in Europe that included Russia and in which Russia was not an outsider.
In this conflict, the United States is currently not directly involved, at least not with military forces on the ground, actively fighting in Ukraine, but there is a significant risk that the war could escalate into a direct military conflict between Russia and the United States.
Another potential great power conflict is the growing rivalry between the United States and China. This is a situation the United States has never faced in its history. During the Cold War, the United States faced a Soviet Union that was militarily equal but economically weak. The Soviet economy was powerful in terms of military industry, but it could not create a thriving civilian economy. It had no technological rival to the US economy and was not integrated into the world, either. The Soviet economy, along with the Warsaw Pact states, was self-sufficient. They wanted to keep themselves separate from the rest of the world economy rather than integrate into it. But this is not true for China, which is increasingly becoming more on a par with the United States, both militarily and economically. China is increasingly working in partnership with Russia against the United States, and this is unprecedented for us in our history. During the Cold War - particularly under President Nixon - when we were open to China, we had better relations with both China and the Soviet Union than existed between the two. That is no longer true. So we are now facing a much different geopolitical challenge, a much different geopolitical challenge, while we are in a much more difficult situation. Moreover, we are only now beginning to think about how to deal with it.
Why do you think the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) and even Finland are afraid of the Russian bear?
They have all suffered real military aggression from Moscow. In the case of the Baltic states, they were conquered and absorbed into the Soviet Union against their will. Finland was also invaded by the Soviet Union, Helsinki lost considerable territory and was forced to sign a neutrality treaty, a Finlandization situation. So it's clear from these historical antecedents that they are concerned about Russian intentions.
What do you think about the sending of billions in arms to Ukraine? And what do you think about the deployment of long-range missiles on Russian territory, something much talked about by Western politicians?
Transferring long-range missiles to Ukraine and allowing them to strike deep into Russian territory creates a potentially very dangerous situation. The Russians have made it clear that this would be viewed as NATO engaging in at war against Russia. These missiles are entirely dependent on Western support. The Western satellite guidance, the terrain mapping software, these can only come from the United States. So the Russians consider this a red line. I doubt that their response would be to deploy nuclear weapons, but I think the Russians would have to do something if the West decides that it will provide and authorize use of these long-range devices. In this situation, the Russians would need to act in a way that backs up their threats, otherwise we won't deal with them seriously in the future. I do not think they are willing to face that. So I think it's a very dangerous situation. And there's very little that these long-range strikes would actually change, militarily, regarding Ukraine's position vis-a-vis Russia on the battlefield.
Cover photo: George Beebe, Director of the Quincy Institute's Grand Strategy Program (Photo: Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs (MKI))
