A Precedent-Setting Decision?
We asked the expert how the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union should be interpreted from a legal standpoint, and whether it can be considered precedent-setting. Zoltan Lomnici Jr. explained that
from a legal perspective, the court’s decision primarily means that the Luxembourg forum did not question child protection itself as a legitimate state objective, but examined whether the tools chosen by Hungarian regulation meet the necessity and proportionality tests required by EU law.
He emphasized that Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes the protection of children as an independent fundamental value, while the court found that certain provisions of the Hungarian law imposed overly broad, general, and prior restrictions. As he put it, this disproportionately affected the freedom to provide services under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter, and the prohibition of discrimination under Article 21.
The precedent-setting nature of the decision is reinforced by the fact that the court treated the fundamental values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union as independently and directly applicable benchmarks in an infringement procedure under the TFEU, which can be considered a particularly significant step in the development of EU law,
– he pointed out.
Member State Competence And The Primacy Of EU Law
Asked where the boundary lies between member state competence and the primacy of EU law in such sensitive social matters, Zoltan Lomnici Jr. said the line is particularly difficult to draw. He noted that family law, education, morality, and child protection traditionally fall within the competence of member states, a principle also partly safeguarded by respect for national identity under Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union. At the same time, he stressed that
if a member state adopts regulation in these areas that affects the freedoms of the single market or EU fundamental rights, EU oversight automatically comes into play.
In this context, he also pointed to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Handyside v. United Kingdom as an important counterpoint. As he explained, Strasbourg explicitly held that in matters of public morals, member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation because there is no uniform European moral standard. He added that the current ruling, by contrast, allows for a narrower margin of maneuver for member states, which is why many interpret it as a centralizing approach that restricts national autonomy.






















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