Miklos Szantho: The Numbers Don’t Lie—Election Campaign Unfolds in the Shadow of Brussels and Kyiv

Accusations of lying, electoral math, wartime pressure, and political maneuvering in Brussels—at a Szazadveg conference, Magyar Nemzet spoke with Miklos Szantho, Director General of the Center for Fundamental Rights, about what is truly at stake in the campaign, why the Tisza Party’s numbers do not add up, and why the success of the national petition is now a key issue.

Miklos Szantho, Director General of the Center for Fundamental Rights, (Photo: Attila Polyak)

 What was your reaction to Peter Magyar accusing you and the Center for Fundamental Rights of lying, despite the clear data from the National Election Office showing that Magyar’s group returned 13,806 signature forms for nominees, making it physically impossible for them to have collected 250,000 or even 300,000 signatures, given that each sheet can contain a maximum of eight signatures?

Based on Peter Magyar’s track record so far, it has almost become a reliable indicator that whoever he accuses of lying is very likely telling the truth. The same scenario played out again. On Saturday, he made a massive false claim when he triumphantly announced that the Tisza Party had gathered 250,000 signatures, while the official data obtained by the Center for Fundamental Rights from the National Election Office clearly shows that the number of forms issued to them that day would have been sufficient for no more than 110,000 signatures. This is not a matter of political debate—it is simple mathematics. If one sheet can contain a maximum of eight signatures, then with 13,806 returned sheets, the claim of 250,000 to 300,000 signatures simply does not add up. What we are seeing is the familiar pattern of double-speak: grandiose exaggerations in public, contrasted with stubborn, irrefutable data behind the scenes. Peter Magyar’s two-faced approach is not merely exaggeration; it is a consistent contradiction of the facts. And facts, however inconvenient, are stubborn things.

Photo: Attila Polyak

According to multiple consistent sources, Peter Magyar convened a crisis meeting in which he acknowledged that despite favorable polling, the Tisza Party could lose in most individual districts. He also warned of a brutal smear campaign and suggested that if they lose, he will likely leave Hungary. The Center for Fundamental Rights also conducts regular polling—how do you assess the race? And what does it reveal that less than 50 days before the election, Magyar is preparing his party for defeat?

In recent weeks, even the left has begun to rediscover its sense of reality. A growing number of voices are acknowledging that Fidesz–KDNP could ultimately win the election. Reliable polling institutes such as Szazadveg, Nezopont, and the Center for Fundamental Rights have consistently measured a government-party lead since last fall—pollster Median, in my view, is not conducting public opinion research but public opinion shaping. Four years ago, their final forecast was off by 16 percentage points, so now, following a “go big or go home” approach, they have floated a 20-point lead for Tisza. That does not mean the race is over. Difficult, eventful weeks lie ahead, the stakes are enormous, and the contest will be fierce. However, based on the current numbers, the governing parties are in the lead. That makes it particularly telling that Peter Magyar has begun preparing his own supporters for defeat. The left-wing media conglomerate and self-appointed “experts” have once again revived the familiar narrative of alleged election fraud. This recycled false narrative serves three purposes. First, it provides a ready-made explanation in case the Tisza Party loses. Second, it serves to mobilize supporters for potential unrest. If Fidesz–KDNP wins but by a narrower margin than in 2022, the script will already be prepared: “we told you so.” This could be used to stir unrest, especially in Budapest. Third—and perhaps most importantly—there is the international dimension. This is no longer just political rhetoric but formally framed, though false, legal-style arguments. If doubts can be planted about the legitimacy of the election, Brussels, international organizations, and parts of the global media can easily latch onto that narrative. From that point forward, the issue becomes one of sovereignty. If they succeed in creating the impression that the Hungarian government is “illegitimate,” it could have unforeseeable consequences in EU decision-making. Such a narrative could become a geopolitical tool—for example, Hungary’s prime minister might not be invited to key EU meetings on Ukraine or war financing, potentially clearing the way for Ukraine’s EU accession.

 The Russia-Ukraine conflict has entered its fifth year. Prime Minister Viktor Orban has said Hungary “will not yield to blackmail” and that diplomatic relations between Hungary and Ukraine have reached a low point. How much worse could relations become, especially with less than 50 days until the elections?

The situation has indeed reached a historic low, but it is important to clearly explain why. The deterioration in Hungarian-Ukrainian political and diplomatic relations is not the fault of the Ukrainian people but of Kyiv and what I would describe as President Volodymyr Zelensky’s wartime mafia. In the fourth year of the war, we see not de-escalation but institutionalization. Pro-war forces have gathered in Kyiv and decided to continue the war, while Hungary’s energy security and economic interests are clearly being pushed aside. Peter Magyar made an agreement in Munich and is being supported in Hungary’s elections because this could allow Hungary to be used in the war effort. Viktor Orbán’s position has been consistent: Hungary will not yield to pressure and will not sacrifice its national interests for a fundamentally flawed geopolitical vision centered on the total defeat of Russia. It must also be remembered that Hungary has carried out one of the largest humanitarian efforts in its history to help Ukraine. Hungary has played—and continues to play—a critical role in maintaining energy supplies. A significant portion of Ukraine’s electricity and gas imports continues to arrive through Hungarian infrastructure. Against this backdrop, it is particularly striking that Ukraine, “in gratitude,” has shut down the Druzhba oil pipeline. This has further deepened the crisis. The Ukrainian leadership has the opportunity to ease tensions. One concrete first step would be the immediate restoration of oil deliveries, followed by restoring the previous rights of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia.

How do you assess the fact that the war in Ukraine has overshadowed all other campaign issues?

It overshadows everything because many of today’s key economic and political issues are directly tied to the war. The left’s tax-increase proposals to finance Ukraine, the possible reintroduction of conscription, and the push to abandon affordable Russian oil are not isolated matters—they are direct consequences of wartime policy. Brussels and Kyiv have formed a political axis on these issues, and it is clear they intend to interfere in Hungary’s elections. The Tisza Party and the left-wing political machinery behind it serve as instruments in this effort. The financial disputes with Brussels, the various legal proceedings, and the ongoing political pressure all point in the same direction: removing the right from positions of decision-making power and replacing it with a pro-Ukraine, pro-war political force. The goal is clear—to draw Hungary into the political and economic structure of the war, give the green light to Ukraine’s EU accession, and dismantle the sovereigntist position represented by patriots. At the European level, the war hysteria also serves a political function. Brussels uses the war as a kind of purifying fire to obscure or push aside social and economic problems, many of which it helped create. As long as the wartime atmosphere persists, there is less discussion about competitiveness, migration, or the excesses of gender ideology. That is why the war overshadows everything—it is not a side issue of foreign policy, but the central political dividing line of our time.

Can the Hungarian government support the 20th sanctions package when the prime minister has previously concluded that the sanctions do not work?

Hungary has consistently taken a clear, realist position on sanctions. Viktor Orban has repeatedly said that sanctions have failed to achieve their intended effect while causing serious economic damage to Europe, including Hungary. When the possibility of a veto arose, Brussels immediately began exploring ways to bypass Hungary. We saw this in the case of phasing out Russian oil and gas, which was ultimately adopted as a trade policy measure rather than a sanctions package, precisely because that did not require unanimity. Overall, Hungary’s position is a pragmatic one: it means prioritizing Hungary’s interests—not Kyiv’s and not Brussels’. Anyone who seeks to turn Hungary into a servant of imperial interests at Germany’s command—especially by pushing it eastward, given the tragedies of the 20th century—is committing a grave sin against Hungary.

 Has the deterioration in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations increased the importance of the ongoing national petition? Have you filled it out?

Absolutely. I have not only filled it out but returned it as well—not out of courtesy, but out of conviction. In recent years, Kyiv and Brussels have done everything possible to push Hungary onto the war axis. In such circumstances, every tool that provides direct political authorization to a government becomes more valuable. Previous national consultations and initiatives such as Voks 2025 have served this purpose: providing clear, quantifiable legitimacy behind Hungary’s position. In 21st-century European politics, legitimacy is hard currency. At EU meetings, where many leaders have relatively weak domestic mandates, it carries special weight when someone can point to concrete public support. Prime Minister Viktor Orban negotiates from that position. However, this is not a one-time effort. It requires constant work to keep Hungary out of the war, maintain household utility cost protections, and ensure that Hungarians’ money is not spent on foreign war objectives. How can Hungary act most effectively? By ensuring the national petition achieves overwhelming success. That provides the political backing needed in international disputes.

Cover photo: Miklos Szantho, Director General of the Center for Fundamental Rights,  (Photo: Attila Polyak)